Title

Trading Coups For Civil War: The Strategic Logic Of Tolerating Rebellion

Keywords

civil war; coup-proofing; military coups; political survival; security

Abstract

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency.

Publication Date

10-2-2014

Publication Title

African Security Review

Volume

23

Issue

4

Number of Pages

329-338

Document Type

Article

Personal Identifier

scopus

DOI Link

https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2014.944196

Socpus ID

85027923545 (Scopus)

Source API URL

https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/85027923545

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