Title
Evolving Concepts Of Evolution: The Case Of Shame And Guilt
Abstract
Evolutionary biologists often refer to a distinction between ultimate and proximate explanation. On the one hand, such a distinction points to important issues for social psychologists, especially in terms of what it means to say that people experience emotions such as guilt and shame. On the other hand, the value of the ultimate/proximate distinction depends on how it is understood because its application can be problematic. We illustrate the use and possible misuse of the distinction in terms of its application to the differentiation of the self-conscious emotions guilt and shame.
Publication Date
12-1-2014
Publication Title
Social and Personality Psychology Compass
Volume
8
Issue
12
Number of Pages
659-671
Document Type
Article
Personal Identifier
scopus
DOI Link
https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12137
Copyright Status
Unknown
Socpus ID
84918767329 (Scopus)
Source API URL
https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/84918767329
STARS Citation
Folger, Robert; Johnson, Michael; and Letwin, Chaim, "Evolving Concepts Of Evolution: The Case Of Shame And Guilt" (2014). Scopus Export 2010-2014. 8349.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/scopus2010/8349