Keywords

Supreme Court, presidency, Game Theory, logitstic regression, attitudinal model

Abstract

The interaction between the President and Congress is many times quite public and well documented (Cronin 1980; Covington et al. 1995; Fisher 1994; Schlesinger 2004). Similarly, relations between the Congress and the Supreme Court are well documented; Congress makes law and, if requested, the Court interprets it. The interaction between the president and the Court, however, is not nearly as well defined, and certainly not as public. Supreme Court cases involving the president directly are fairly rare. King and Meernik (1995) identify 347 cases involving the foreign policy powers of the president, decided from 1790 to 1996, which is roughly 1.5 cases per calendar year. This study will examine the influence of attitudinal and extra-attitudinal factors on the individual level decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court justices in cases involving presidential power. By using both attitudinal and extra-attitudinal factors, such as public opinion and armed conflict, this study will explore the limitations of a simple attitudinal model in complex and highly salient cases such as those that involve presidential power. The cases to be examined will be all presidential power cases decided from 1949 to 2005 (N = 38). The unit of analysis will, however, be the justice's individual-level vote (N = 337).

Notes

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Graduation Date

2006

Semester

Summer

Advisor

Lanier, Drew

Degree

Master of Arts (M.A.)

College

College of Sciences

Department

Political Science

Degree Program

Political Science

Format

application/pdf

Identifier

CFE0001202

URL

http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/CFE0001202

Language

English

Length of Campus-only Access

None

Access Status

Masters Thesis (Open Access)

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