Abstract
States have a diverse and unique set of available mechanisms to deploy when seeking to interact in the international community. Economic sanctions have long been one such tool available for states looking to coerce or incentivize a change in the behavior of another state. Likewise, states have historically sought to influence and gain unknown knowledge on another state or actor. Covert intelligence operations have changed forms, mechanisms, and techniques, especially since the expansive advancements in technology in the 21st century. This paper seeks to understand the influence that economic sanctions have on the ability for single-party states to conduct intelligence operations against the United States. A comparative case study, composed of a series of questions and deployed in a casebook method, explores these unique behaviors through the cases of Cuba and China. A better understanding between economic sanctions and intelligence operations can offer American foreign policymakers another avenue to consider when deploying economic sanctions.
Thesis Completion
2022
Semester
Spring
Thesis Chair/Advisor
Larsen, Kelsey
Degree
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
College
College of Sciences
Department
School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs
Degree Program
Political Science
Language
English
Access Status
Open Access
Release Date
5-1-2022
Recommended Citation
Anta, Anthony J., "Spies, Sanctions, and Single-Party States: How American Sanctions Influence Intelligence Operations" (2022). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 1107.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/1107