Abstract

Heterogeneous consumers make the decision to buy a durable good or to download a replica, and a monopolist chooses to price and protect their intellectual property in the form of an authentication cost. An optimal price and authentication cost is derived, and shown to be higher than the efficient outcome for a uniform distribution of consumers. The optimal selection of price and protection are shown to be commensurate with his authenticating technology, and the searching ability of consumers. As an extension, a layout for a monopolist problem where consumers have different searching abilities is shown to be indistinct from a homogeneous case when consumers are uniformly distributed.

Thesis Completion

2019

Semester

Spring

Thesis Chair/Advisor

Burguet, Roberto

Degree

Bachelor of Science (B.S.)

College

College of Business Administration

Department

Economics

Degree Program

Economics

Language

English

Access Status

Open Access

Length of Campus-only Access

1 year

Release Date

5-1-2020

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